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Corporate Boards, Ownership Structures and Corporate Disclosures: Evidence 
from a Developing Country 
    
Abstract 
 
Purpose: This paper investigates the effect of corporate board attributes, ownership structure and 
firm-level characteristics on both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour in annual 
reports of Libyan firms. 
 
Design/methodology/approach:  Multivariate regression techniques are used to estimate the effect 
of corporate board and ownership structures on mandatory and voluntary disclosures of a sample of 
Libyan firms between 2006 and 2010. 
 
Findings: First, we find that board size, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and the 
presence of an audit committee have an impact on the level of corporate disclosure. Second, this study 
finds an evidence that director ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional 
ownership have a non-linear effect on the level of corporate disclosure. Finally, we find that firm age, 
liquidity, listing status, industry type and auditor type are positively associated with the level of 
corporate disclosure. 
 
Limitation: Future research could investigate disclosure practices using other channels of corporate 
disclosure, such as corporate websites. Useful insights may be offered also by future studies by 
conducting in-depth interviews with corporate managers, directors and owners regarding these 
issues.  
Implication: Investors may also rely on such corporate governance characteristics to shape 
expectations about voluntary and/or mandatory information disclosure. 
  
Originality/value: Existing disclosure studies have mainly examined governance and voluntary 
disclosure relationship in non-listed firms. Our study, therefore, extends, as well as contributes to the 
existing literature by the examining the governance-disclosure nexus relating to both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures in both listed and non-listed firms. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance; Board and ownership structures; Corporate disclosure behaviour; 
Multi-theoretical perspective.  
 
Paper type: Research Paper 
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1. Introduction 
The quality and quantity of information disclosed by companies in annual reports in a particular 
country depends heavily on its level of economic development, the development of the accounting 
profession, the legislation in force and the existence of a sophisticated financial market (Saudagaran 
and Biddle, 1992, Jaggi and Pek Yee, 2000, Roberts et al., 2005; Elghuweel et al., 2017). In this vein, 
following recent changes and reforms of both the Libyan economy and legislation of financial 
reporting, government legislation and laws have played a major role in shaping the current financial 
reporting practices in Libya (Kribat et al., 2013). In this case, Libyan context specific issues offer an 
interesting setting for many reasons. First, the economy of Libya used to be unique in many aspects 
due to the peculiar characteristics of its political regime and the rise in contribution over the last 30 
years of the petroleum sector to its economy. A large proportion of this source of income has been 
used to establish industrial companies in non-oil sectors over the last two decades (Almehdi, 1997). 
Second, the Libyan legal system developed from a combination of Islamic legal principles and French 
Civil law with all the main laws, including the Civil Code, Income Tax Law (ITL), Libyan Banking 
Law (BL)  and the Libyan Commercial Law (LCL) having undergone substantial amendments since 
1954 (El-Firjani et al., 2014; La Porta et al., 1997; Elmghaamez & Ntim, 2016). Third, the use of LCL 
in 1954 was a pioneer effort in the corporate governance field. Specifically, the LCL consists of a 
number of Articles that demonstrate the main corporate governance principles. For example, it 
highlighted the main responsibilities, working mechanism and structure of the board of directors and 
the monitoring committee (Abdul Karim, 2005; El-Firjani et al., 2014; Shernanna, 2013).  
 
Fourth, despite the growth in the economy, the accounting profession in Libya is still relatively under 
developed. The Libyan Accountants and Auditors Association was established in 1973. However, it 
only prepared its first Libyan Accounting Standards draft, which included 29 accounting standards, 
in 2006. Fifth, the establishment of the LCL in 1953 was the cornerstone of corporate governance in 
Libya providing guidelines for establishing, registering, managing, governing and dissolving all 
forms of firms. Moreover, it also establishes the sanctions that may be imposed on companies for any 
failure to satisfy any requirements of the law. Finally, corporate ownership is largely concentrated in 
the form of government, family (directors) and foreign institutional investors (Halal et al., 2014). 
Together, these Libyan context specific issues offer an interesting setting to examine the drivers of 
corporate disclosures. The researchers, therefore, seek to examine the extent to which corporate board 
mechanisms, ownership structures, and firm-level characteristics, may impact on the level of 
corporate disclosures in this distinct corporate context. 
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To-date, prior research has provided inconclusive definition of disclosure. According to Cooke (1992, 
p. 231) disclosure can be defined as “consisting of both voluntary and mandatory items of information 
provided in the financial statements, notes to the accounts, management’s analysis of operations for 
the current and forthcoming year and any supplementary information”. Similarly, Gibbins et al 
(1990, p. 122) defined financial disclosure as “any deliberate release of financial information, 
whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via formal or informal channels”. On the 
other hand, a comprehensive definition of financial disclosure was provided by Choi (1973, p. 160) 
“the publication of any economic information relating to a business enterprise, qualitative or 
otherwise, which facilitates the making of investment decisions”. In the same vein, von Alberti-
Alhtaybat et al. (2012), Abdul Karim (2005), and Al-Janadi et al. (2016) further subdivided disclosure 
into (i) textual and financial, (ii) voluntary and mandatory, and (iii) in print and/ or internet 
disclosures. However, von Alberti-Alhtaybat et al. (2012) have argued that a complete and perfect 
accounting financial information is presumably depended on users’ needs, as well as it is influenced 
by managers’ incentives. Thus, it could be argued that disclosure is often aimed at providing high 
quality financial information that can reduce information asymmetry and thus useful for market 
efficiency and decision-making (Abdul Karim, 2005, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Al-Janadi et al., 
2013; von Alberti-Alhtaybat et al., 2012). 
 
In this paper, the researchers seek to contribute to the extant corporate governance and disclosure 
literature by examining the extent to which corporate governance, ownership structure and firm-level 
characteristics can influence both corporate mandatory and voluntary disclosure behaviour using a 
sample of Libyan listed and non-listed firms. The past decades have witnessed the collapse of a 
number of large global corporations in both developed and developing countries, such as China 
Forestry, Enron and WorldCom (Barako et al., 2006, Bozec and Bozec, 2007). These corporate 
failures have often been attributed to poor accountability, corporate governance, disclosure and 
transparency practices (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008, Chen and Roberts, 2010, Fifka, 2013; Ntim, 
2012a, b, 2013a, b, c). Not surprisingly, there has been increasing interest in the issue of corporate 
governance, accountability, disclosure and transparency in recent years (Aljifri, 2008, Aljifri et al., 
2014, Benjamin and Stanga, 1977, Cooke, 1989a, Inchausti, 1997, Wang and Hussainey, 2013). 
Indeed, a number of studies have been conducted, which have aimed at providing an understanding 
of the factors influencing corporate disclosure practices (Benjamin and Stanga, 1977, Cooke, 1989a, 
b, Ho and Shun, 2001, Inchausti, 1997, Meek et al., 1995; Al-Bassam et al,. 2017; Al-Bassam and 
Ntim, 2017). 
 
However, a careful assessment of this literature reveals a number of discernible weaknesses. Firstly, 
despite increasing suggestions that corporations may engage in disclosures for a multiple of 
theoretical reasons and therefore the ability of any single theoretical framework to fully explain the 
motivations underlying corporate disclosures is limited, existing studies are either largely descriptive 
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in nature (Benjamin and Stanga, 1977, Cooke, 1989a, b, Meek et al., 1995, Inchausti, 1997, Owusu-
Ansah, 1998, Ho and Shun, 2001) or underpinned by single theoretical framework (Chen and Roberts, 
2010, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). This limits current understanding of the various motivations 
underlying corporate disclosures. Secondly, although corporate disclosures typically consist of 
mandatory and voluntary ones, existing studies have focused almost exclusively on understanding 
the determinants of, and motivations for, corporate voluntary disclosures to the neglect of mandatory 
disclosures (Abdul Karim, 2005, 2012; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Al-Janadi et al., 2013; Abdullah et al., 
2015, Choi, 1973, Gray et al., 1995, Tsalavoutas, 2011, Shehata et al., 2014). Thirdly, although the 
majority of corporations are non-listed, existing studies examining the motivations for, and 
determinants of, corporate disclosures have focused mainly on listed corporations (Barako et al., 
2006, Bozec and Bozec, 2007). By contrast, there is an acute dearth of studies analysing corporate 
disclosures in non-listed corporations (Benjamin and Stanga, 1977, Cooke, 1989a, b, Ho and Shun, 
2001, Inchausti, 1997, Meek et al., 1995, Owusu-Ansah, 1998), and thereby impairing current 
understanding of corporate disclosure behaviour with respect to non-listed firms is inevitable. 
 
Fourthly, despite increasing theoretical and empirical suggestions that corporate decisions, including 
those relating to disclosure are often taken by corporate boards and owners (Eng and Mak, 2003, 
Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013), existing studies have focused primarily on examining how firm-level 
characteristics, such as firm size and industry, drive corporate disclosures. In contrast, studies 
investigating the extent to which corporate governance and ownership structures can influence the 
extent of corporate disclosures are rare (Collett and Hrasky, 2005), and thereby limiting current 
understanding of how and why corporate governance and ownership structures may influence 
corporate disclosure behaviour. Finally, despite increasing importance of developing countries 
around the world, existing studies examining corporate disclosure behaviour are primarily 
concentrated in developed countries with largely similar institutional and contextual characteristics 
(Fifka, 2013, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). In contrast, developing countries, such as Libya have 
different economic, institutional, legal and political environments and thus, the effect of corporate 
governance, ownership and firm-level variables on corporate disclosure can be expected to be 
different from those that have been found for firms operating in developed countries. Therefore, an 
examination of the various factors that may influence corporate disclosure behaviour in developing 
countries, where empirical evidence is limited can help in providing full understanding of corporate 
disclosure behaviour around the world (Aljifri, 2008, Aljifri et al., 2014, Benjamin and Stanga, 1977, 
Cooke, 1989a, Inchausti, 1997, Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Ntim et al., 2017a, b). 
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Consequently, this paper seeks to examine the effect of corporate governance, ownership structure 
and firm-level characteristics on the extent of disclosure of Libyan companies, and thereby extending, 
as well as making a number of new contributions to the extant literature. Firstly and unlike most prior 
studies that have examined how firm-level characteristics, such as firm size and industry, affect 
corporate disclosure behaviour, the current study examines how corporate boards, executives and 
owners in addition to firm-level features drive the level of corporate disclosure. Thus, this contributes 
to a small, but gradually increasing number of studies that have evaluated the effect of corporate 
governance and ownership structures on the level of corporate disclosure (Barako et al., 2006, Eng 
and Mak, 2003, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). Secondly, distinct from 
prior studies that have focused mainly on examining the determinants of only voluntary disclosure, 
the researchers examine the antecedents of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Thirdly, our 
analyses are informed by a number of theoretical perspectives, including agency, resource 
dependence, legitimacy and stakeholder theories. This distinguishes our study from much of the 
existing studies that are either largely descriptive or informed by a single theoretical perspective. 
Finally, distinct from most prior studies, our analyses cover both listed and non-listed firms, and 
thereby allowing us to provide new empirical insights relating to the disclosure behaviour of both 
listed and non-listed firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the theoretical framework.  
Section 3 presents a review of relevant literature and hypotheses development. The research method 
is outlined in Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 presents the 
conclusions, policy implications of the results, and directions for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 Prior studies (Alhazaimeh et al., 2014, Barako et al., 2006, Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Laksmana, 
2008, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013, Samaha et al., 2012, Samaha et 
al., 2015, Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Elmagrhi et al., 2016, 2017) have relied on a number of 
theories, such as agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder theories to inform and 
interpret the motivations of managers to engaging in mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures. These 
theories may inform and interpret the motivations differently. 
 
Firstly, more engage in mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures may decrease agency conflicts (e.g., 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Jensen and Meckling, 1979, Ntim et al., 2013). Hence, enhanced 
7 
 
mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures may decrease information asymmetry between managers and 
firm stockholders and develops the shareholders ability to monitor management’s practices (Beekes 
et al., 2016). In this context, agency theory suggests a monitoring role of the CG mechanisms to 
monitor managerial behaviours influencing shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983). This role confirms 
that the managers interest in line with shareholders (Fama 1980, Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, CG 
practices may minimize agency costs and how successfully monitors whether managers to work their 
opportunistic behaviour rather than the shareholders’ interests. However, agency theory was 
criticized because it focuses on the opportunistic behaviour assumption and ignore other stakeholders. 
Also, shareholders monitoring through more disclosures can be costly and may reveal information 
which could be damaging to the firm’s competitive position (Beekes et al., 2016, Verrecchia, 1983). 
 
Secondly, and from a legitimacy perspective (Asforth and Gibbs, 1990, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 
Suchman, 1995), engaging in more mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures practices may 
deliberately enhance firm legitimacy to the larger society that may achieve sustainable growth by 
increasing firm reputation. Specifically, legitimacy theory offers that there is a social agreement 
between firms and society. Consequently, firms should act consistently with social values, ethics and 
expectations (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008), and should be responsive to social pressures. Firms 
which disclose more information to fulfil those contracts may experience an increase in social 
acceptance, leading to bridge the legitimacy gap (Branco and Rodrigues, 2008). For example, firms 
may legitimate their survival by disclosing their activities as making a contribution to health, charity 
and environment to society as a whole. But legitimacy theorist could not precisely determine firm 
stakeholders, as well as over explanations of managerial behaviour towards stakeholders instead of 
balancing between stockholders and stakeholders returns (e.g., Kiliç et al., 2015, Ntim et al., 2013). 
 
Thirdly, and from a resource-dependence view, better mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures 
(Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Oliveira et al., 2011, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Pirson and Turnbull, 
2011) may give firms more chance to obtain crucial resources with better costs by improving and 
signalling corporate quality and reputation (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). 
In this context, reduce information asymmetry through better mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures 
may leads to better financing, investment and liquidity effects (Botosan, 1997, Beretta and Bozzolan, 
2004, Brown et al., 2009). Specifically, better mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures may lead to 
lower capital restrictions, enhanced finance access, and conveys financial benefits in the future (e.g., 
Cheng et al., 2014, Hoang et al., 2016). Resource dependence theory suggests that improving CG 
mechanisms is likely to affect firm’s financial returns (Hafsi and Turgut 2013). Resource dependence 
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theory suggests that the CG is a firm resource, consist of expertise, image, and information links 
(Hoang et al., 2016). Thus, CG can leads to improvement in mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures. 
However, the resource-dependence theory relevance in clarifying the disclosure motivations has been 
suggested to be weakened because it is heavily focused on firm corporate strategic reasons rather than 
showing accountability and liability to other stakeholders. 
 
Fourthly, stakeholder theory implies that engaging in improved mandatorily and voluntarily 
disclosures (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013, Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Kiliç et al., 2015) might be 
strategic approach to obtain the support of key stakeholders, such as, potential investors, creditors, 
customers, suppliers, auditors, employees and government (Freeman, 1984, Donaldson and Preston, 
1995), who are essential to the firm ability for sustainability conducting their operations. These 
stakeholders have expectations regarding disclosure practices of the firms, such as accounting 
policies, corporate governance, CSR, and future prospects. Firms should meet the stakeholders’ 
expectations to achieve sustainable growth by using mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures as a 
communication channel (Barako and Brown, 2008, Kiliç et al., 2015). Thus, working responsibly to 
firms’ stakeholders and confirming sound connections will develop the firm’s performance and build 
strategic benefits for its shareholders and other stakeholders sequentially (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013, Kiliç et al., 2015). However, stakeholder theorist also could not specifically determine powerful 
stakeholders, as well as over explanations of managerial behaviour towards stakeholders instead of 
stockholders returns. 
 
As briefly discussed, there are obvious limits with each distinct theoretical viewpoint’s ability to 
inform and interpret the motivations of managers to engaging in mandatorily and voluntarily 
disclosures, thus, this paper implement a multi-theoretical frame that consider these theories to be 
complementary instead of competing ideas. The researchers debate that a joined consideration will 
offer better basis for understanding and explaining the motivations for mandatorily and voluntarily 
disclosures within the Libya context. The researchers, therefore, draw from these theories in 
developing our hypotheses. However, as these theories have widely been discussed in the extant 
literature, this paper does not offer detailed expatiations on their underlying assumptions and 
meanings. 
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3. Empirical literature and hypotheses development 
Firstly, prior studies (Alhazaimeh et al., 2014, Barako et al., 2006, Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, 
Laksmana, 2008, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013, Samaha et al., 2012, 
Samaha et al., 2015, Wang and Hussainey, 2013) have relied on a number of theories, such as agency, 
legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder theories to inform and interpret their finding. The 
researchers, therefore, draw from these theories in developing our hypotheses. However, as these 
theories have widely been discussed in the extant literature, this paper does not offer detailed 
expatiations on their underlying assumptions and meanings. Secondly, although extensive research 
has been carried out investigating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and ownership 
structure on corporate disclosure practices (Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Eng and 
Mak, 2003, Gul and Leung, 2004, Arcay and Muiño, 2005, Cheng and Courtenay, 2006, Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006), most of these studies focus on developed countries leading to inadequate evidence 
from developing countries. Thirdly, whilst a number of studies have been conducted in a number of 
developing countries, these are limited to countries, such as Kenya by Barako et al. (2006), UAE by 
Adawi and Rwegasira (2011) and Aljifri et al. (2014), South Africa by Ntim et al. (2012a, b), Egypt 
by Samaha et al. (2012), Tunisia by Fathi (2013), and Jordon by Alhazaimeh et al. (2014). The 
researchers, therefore, examine the effect of board variables (i.e., board size, CEO role duality, board 
composition, frequency of board meetings and the existence of an audit committee) and ownership 
mechanisms (director ownership, foreign ownership, government ownership and institutional 
ownership) on the level of corporate disclosure in Libya. To the best of our knowledge, this will be 
the first attempt to investigating the effect of board and ownership mechanisms on the level of 
corporate disclosure in Libya, and thus offers vital opportunities to extend, as well as make a number 
of new contributions to the extant corporate governance and disclosure literature. 
 
In terms of corporate governance and in particular, the responsibilities of the board of directors 
(consisting of a balance in terms of executive and non-executive directors), the LCL does not specify 
the exact number of directors that should form corporate boards, instead it leaves this to the general 
assembly of a firm to decide, including the power to appoint the board members. With regard to the 
appointment of the chairman of the board by the general assembly, the members of the board are in 
position, where they have the right to elect one of the members to be the chairman. The roles of the 
chairman and CEO is expected to be held by two different people (The New Libyan Legislation Code, 
1972. Article 172). In addition, according to the LCL, managing and establishing the general policy 
of a firm is the responsibility of the board of directors, which needs to be approved by its general 
assembly. Furthermore, the LCL requires every company to establish an audit committee, as well as 
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expecting corporate boards to meet at least six times in a year (Articles 35 and 38 of the 1970 
Commercial Act). Similar to other developing countries, but different from most developed countries, 
corporate ownership is largely concentrated in the form of government, family (directors) and foreign 
institutional investors (Halal et al., 2014). Together, these Libyan context specific issues offer an 
interesting setting to examine the drivers of corporate disclosures. The researchers, therefore, seek to 
examine the extent to which corporate governance, ownership and firm-level characteristics may 
impact on the level of corporate disclosures in this corporate context. 
 
3.1 Corporate governance characteristics  
As the objective of this paper is to assess how corporate governance mechanisms influence corporate 
disclosure practices in Libya, five related corporate governance variables are being investigated, 
namely board size, CEO role duality, board composition, the frequency of board meetings and 
existence of an audit committee. 
 
Board size: According to agency theory, board size is a key determinant in monitoring its activities 
and decision making. Board size is measured by the number of both executive and non-executive 
directors (NEDS) on the board. It has been argued by Laksmana (2008) that a large board leads to a 
higher opportunity to have diversity of experts in areas, such as financial reporting. More importantly, 
Samaha et al. (2012) suggest that larger boards are less likely to be dominated by senior executives. 
As a result, firms with larger board size are more likely to disclose more information than those with 
smaller board size. By the same token, stakeholder theory assumes that firms with larger boards can 
get greater access to their external environment, which as result secures resources such as finance and 
business contracts and reduces uncertainties (Jia et al., 2009). On the other hand, others claim that 
larger boards are associated with poor communication and monitoring leading to a negative impact 
on firms’ disclosure behaviour (Herman, 1981, Jensen, 1993; Ntim, 2016). In addition, resource 
dependence theory postulates that larger boards are more likely to consist of greater diversity of 
expertise and stakeholder representation, which can contribute to improved corporate reputation 
(Lajili and Zéghal, 2005, Linsley and Shrives, 2006). 
 
Empirically and although most prior research supports the positive association between board size 
and corporate disclosure behaviour (Barako et al., 2006, Gao and kling, 2012, Laksmana, 2008, Wang 
and Hussainey, 2013, Samaha et al., 2015). For instance, Gao and kling, 2012 examine the 
relationship between board size and disclosure level using Chinese companies from 2001 to 2007. 
Using constructed disclosure index, Gao and kling, 2012 find that board size is positively infelunce 
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disclosure level.However, some researchers found no relationship between board size and disclosure 
level (Lakhal, 2005, Othman et al., 2014, Ebrahim and Fattah, 2015). On the other hand, some studies 
argue that board size may have a negative impact on the board effectiveness, leading members to be 
less motivated to take part in decision making and resulting in low levels of disclosure (Yermack, 
1996, Byard et al., 2006). Although, the LCL does not specify the exact number of directors that 
should form a corporate board, the researchers expect a positive association between board size and 
corporate disclosure. Based on the above discussion, the researchers propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a significant positive association between board size and the level of corporate disclosure 
in annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
CEO Role Duality: CEO role duality is where the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a firm also serves 
as the chairman of the board. Theories such as agency, stakeholder and resource-dependence theories 
postulate that duality in position of CEO can have a negative impact on corporate performance and 
disclosure (Reverte, 2009). From the agency perspective, duality in position provides the CEO with 
a power that might negatively impact on the board’s control. It is argued that effectiveness in board 
monitoring can be by having a large number of independent directors, which can lead to greater 
transparency and disclosure (Gul and Leung, 2004). By the same token, Fama and Jensen (1983) state 
that independence of directors is a key determinant in the process of monitoring managers’ 
performance and earnings. From resource-dependence theory perspective, separating the board 
chairman and CEO positions can improve a firm’s legitimacy in its environment (legitimacy theory) 
as well as stakeholders’ participation (stakeholder theory) by encouraging equality and fairness in 
executive decision making (Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012).  
 
With regard to the empirical relationship between role duality and the extent of corporate disclosure, 
prior research has provided mixed results divided into two streams. The first stream finds that there 
is no significant association between these two variables (Ho and Shun, 2001, Arcay and Muiño, 
2005, Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). The other stream finds a negative relationship between the two 
variables (Eng and Mak, 2003, Gul and Leung, 2004, Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012, Michelon and 
Parbonetti, 2012, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, Ebrahim and Fattah, 2015, Samaha et al., 2015). In 
the Libyan corporate context, the LCL fails to discuss the important issue of CEO role duality. Based 
on the above theoretical underpinning and empirical findings, the researchers submit the following 
hypothesis: 
12 
 
 
H2: There is a significant negative association between role duality and the level of disclosure in 
annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
Board composition: Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that boards composed of a higher proportion of 
independent NEDs are more influential in monitoring and controlling managerial decisions than those 
with lower proportion. According to agency and stakeholder theories, the board of directors is 
perceived not only as a key mechanism of internal control  for monitoring managers and to mitigate 
agency problems between managers and shareholders, but also as a mechanism to advance the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as employees and communities (Chen and Roberts, 2010, Ntim 
et al., 2013). In this regard, the increased independence associated with NEDs assumes that their 
presence may enhance corporate response to stakeholders’ informational needs (Lopes and 
Rodrigues, 2007). Similarly, legitimacy theory argues that the legitimacy concern of modern 
companies comes from the separation of ownership from control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
legitimacy gap is thought to be alleviated through appointing independent NEDs to ensure 
stakeholders’ interests are achieved (Freeman and Reed, 1983). 
 
Empirically, a range of board decisions are found to be influenced by independent directors. This 
argument was clearly supported by the findings of Beasley (1996), when he reported that boards with 
higher proportion of outside directors are less likely to witness financial statement fraud, and Dechow 
et al. (1996) found that firms with boards dominated by management have more likelihood to 
experience accounting enforcement actions by the SEC. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, 
prior research has provided mixed results regarding association between the proportion of NEDs and 
voluntary disclosure. Some studies found  evidence of positive association between NEDs and 
voluntary disclosure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000, Leung and Horwitz, 2004, Barako et al., 2006, Ntim et 
al., 2012b, Alhazaimeh et al., 2014, Samaha et al., 2015). Conversely, other researchers found either 
no association (Ho and Shun, 2001, Aljifri et al., 2014, Ebrahim and Fattah, 2015) or negative 
association between the two (Ho and Shun, 2001, Eng and Mak, 2003, Gul and Leung, 2004, Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006). With regard to the LCL, the law does not discuss the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board. Therefore, based on the above theoretical and empirical evidence, 
the researchers set the following hypothesis:     
 
H3: There is a significant positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
the level of disclosure in annual reports of Libyan companies. 
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Frequency of meetings: Ntim and Osei (2011) argue that frequency of board meetings measures the 
intensity of a board’s activities and the quality or effectiveness of its monitoring. As a board of 
directors needs to be timely updated regarding firm background and activities, frequent board 
meetings can put greater pressure on management to provide additional information. Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) argue that frequent board meetings are a continuous commitment to share 
information with management. From a positive theoretical perspective, a higher frequency of board 
meetings can help to improve the quality of managerial monitoring which in turn has a positive impact 
on corporate performance (Ntim and Osei, 2011). One the other hand, others argue that board meeting 
cannot be guaranteed to be beneficial to shareholders’ interests. For example, Vafeas (1999) claims 
that the limited time directors spend together is used for routine tasks, such as presentation of 
management reports rather than exchange of ideas and suggestions, which consequently shrink the 
amount of time that outside directors have to monitor management. Empirically, the positive 
argument of this relationship was supported by the findings of Allegrini and Greco (2013), Laksmana, 
(2008) and Barros et al. (2013) who found that a lower frequency of board meetings is associated 
with the extent of disclosure. However, Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), find that there is no significant 
relationship between frequency of meeting of the board and voluntary disclosure. The related 
empirical evidence is in line with the above theoretical evidence, and thus the researchers test the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is a significant positive association between number of board meetings and the level of 
disclosure in annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
Existence of audit committee: Firms form audit committees voluntarily as an essential mechanism to 
monitor agency costs and improve the quantity as well as the quality of information that is disclosed 
for the various corporate stakeholders (Samaha et al., 2012, Othman et al., 2014). According to 
agency theory, the existence of an audit committee can help firms to reduce agency costs particularly 
if it is dominated by NEDs. It is considered to be  an important element for the board of the directors 
to internally control decision making and enhance the quality of information flow between owners 
and managers (Fama, 1980, Arcay and Muiño, 2005). Empirically, Ho and Shun (2001), Barako et 
al. (2006), Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2010) and Samaha et al. (2015) find that the presence of an 
audit committee has a positive impact on corporate disclosure behaviour. On the other hand, others 
do not find such association between the two variables (Allegrini and Greco, 2013, Alhazaimeh et 
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al., 2014, Aljifri et al., 2014). Based on the above theoretical and empirical evidence, the fifth 
hypothesis is formulated below as:           
 
H5: There is a significant positive association between the existence of audit committee and the level 
of disclosure in annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
3.2 Ownership structure variables  
Foreign ownership: From a theoretical perspective, agency theory postulates that ownership becomes 
dispersed as result of an increase in the number shareholders, leading to an increase in the demands 
for more information disclosure (Fama and Jensen, 1983). According to Bradbury (1992), corporate 
disclosure is expected to be higher in widely-held firms, which can consequently lead to an increase 
in information demand from foreign investors because of the separation between owners and 
management. Empirically, Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find that there is 
a significant positive association between foreign ownership and the extent of corporate voluntary 
disclosure. However, Aljifri et al. (2014) find no association between foreign ownership and 
corporate financial disclosure.  
 
In the Libyan context, foreign shareholders are expected to face higher levels of information 
asymmetry due to the language barrier and differences in accounting practices. Therefore, firms with 
higher foreign ownership are expected to advance their disclosure practices and information quality 
such as presenting the annual reports in the English language. This was supported by Xiao et al. 
(2004) when they found that foreign ownership not only improves information disclosure, but also 
encourages firms to prepare English websites to facilitate disclosure of information in English. In this 
regard, a positive association is assumed and the researchers propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: There is a significant positive association between foreign ownership and the level of disclosure 
in the annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
Government ownership: high level of government ownership with strong political connection can 
offer a protection against greater scrutiny and discipline by weak regulatory frameworks which in 
result leads to low disclosure levels in such firms (Ntim et al., 2013). It has been argued that the 
degree of conflicts amongst powerful stakeholders (stakeholder theory), such as government and 
private owners, can lead to higher need for resolution through increasing disclosure level (Eng and 
Mak, 2003). Theoretically, different views exist that attempt to underpin the association between 
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government ownership and corporate disclosure practices. One assumes that firms with higher state 
ownership can easily obtain funding from government, so these firms attract investors with less 
incentive to disclose more information. Conversely, from another perspective, these firms are under 
more public scrutiny, leading to pressure to disclose more information. 
 
Prior literature, to some extent, is mixed regarding the association between government ownership 
and the extent of corporate disclosure. Alhazaimeh et al. (2014), Eng and Mak (2003), Ntim et al. 
(2012b) and Khan et al. (2013) report a positive association between government ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. However, Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find insignificant association between 
state ownership and the extent of information disclosure by Malaysian companies, while Ebrahim 
and Fattah (2015) and Dam and Scholtens (2012) report a negative association between government 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
 
The Libyan government started a privatisation programme to drive the economy from a socialist to a 
market oriented economy by transferring the ownership of government enterprises to foreign and 
institutional investors in order to improve the Libyan economy and attract capital. The emergence of 
the LSM in 2006 was one of the important steps towards the implementation of the privatization 
agenda. The Libyan government is expected to be a powerful stakeholder that helps in legitimising 
their operations and enables access to additional resources (De Villiers and van Staden, 2006). Based 
on the above discussion, the researchers articulate the following hypothesis:     
 
H7: There is a significant positive association between government ownership and the level of 
disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
Institutional ownership: Generally, in large firms a large proportion of shares are owned by 
institutional investors. This large ownership provides institutional investors with the right to play an 
influential role in the structure of corporate governance. Therefore, they are privileged to have 
information advantages over the rest of the minority shareholders. From an agency theory perspective, 
institutional ownership is considered as a key part of effective control over the company, whereby 
managers disclose more information to meet the informational needs of institutional shareholders as 
influential stakeholders (stakeholder theory). In addition, legitimacy theory postulates that firms with 
high institutional ownership are keen to disclose more information to gain their support to justify their 
continued stewardship. 
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Empirically, Xiao et al. (2004) report that there is a positive association between the proportion of 
institutional ownership and the level of internet voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Bushee and Noe 
(2000) and Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) provide evidence that suggests a positive association between 
institutional investors’ ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, Alhazaimeh et al. 
(2014) and Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013a) find a negative association between institutional ownership 
and the level of disclosure. With regard to the Libyan context, the government’s plan to privatise its 
enterprises has led to an increase in the institutional ownership in Libyan privatised firms. Therefore, 
the researchers expect firms with high institutional ownership to disclose more information. 
Accordingly, the researchers test the following hypothesis: 
 
H8: There is a significant positive association between institutional ownership and the level of 
disclosure in the annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
Director ownership: As a result of directors’ ownership, agency costs can be reduced, because 
director ownership can  lead to alignment of the interests of owners and management (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). This can help in reducing the need for incurring monitoring and bonding costs and 
thus disclosure. As a result, shareholders will bear the increase in agency costs (Eng and Mak, 2003, 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006). The increase in monitoring costs of a firm will encourage managers to 
disclose more voluntary information. Therefore, director ownership is perceived as an alternative 
corporate governance mechanism to disclosure, in which the need for more monitoring and disclosure 
decreases with higher director ownership. Agency theory suggests that there is a contradictory 
association between voluntary disclosures and director ownership. The extent of managerial 
ownership serves a way to align the management’s interests with those of other shareholders leading 
to an increase in disclosure level (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It argues that firms with higher 
proportion of director ownership are associated with less information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent. Empirically, Eng and Mak (2003), Nagar et al. (2003) and Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) found a negative association between director ownership and corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Based on the above, the researchers set hypothesis as follows:     
 
H9: There is a significant negative association between director ownership and the level of disclosure 
in the annual reports of Libyan companies. 
 
 
3.3 Control variables 
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In line with prior research, company characteristics are included in this study as control variables 
(Bradbury, 1992, Ho and Shun, 2001, Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Barako et al., 2006, Ghazali and 
Weetman, 2006, Hassan et al., 2009). These are firm size, firm age, gearing, profitability, liquidity, 
listing status, industry type and auditor type. According to agency theory, large firms are more likely 
to be associated with agency costs due to the separation of management from ownership. Therefore, 
larger firms are more motivated to disclose more information than smaller firms (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990).  
 
Furthermore, firm age, gearing and profitability are expected to be positively associated with 
corporate disclosure practices. Also, listing status, industry type and auditor type can influence the 
extent of disclosure in annual reports. With regard to the association between corporate characteristics 
and disclosure, previous research provides mixed evidence regarding the association corporate 
characteristics and corporate disclosure behaviour. Naser (1998) found a positive relationship 
between leverage and corporate disclosure, whereas Bradbury (1992) found no significant 
relationship. By the same token, Inchausti (1997) observed a positive association between the type of 
auditor and disclosure level. On the other hand, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) report no association. 
 
4. Research methodology 
4.1 Data collection and sampling 
In this paper, secondary data is drawn from the annual reports of Libyan companies. Since this 
research aims to examine the association between corporate governance characteristics and ownership 
structure and the extent of disclosure in Libyan companies’ annual reports, a disclosure index is 
developed to measure disclosure level. In order to provide a comprehensive picture of corporate 
reporting in the Libyan context, annual reports of three sectors namely; banks, manufacturing and 
services are collected. The rationale behind this is that these are the dominant sectors “after the oil 
and gas sector” in the Libyan economy in terms of their contribution to the total gross domestic 
product. The oil and gas sector is excluded as most of the companies operating in this sector are either 
foreign companies or partners of foreign companies with more advanced accounting and reporting 
practices. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit 
Bureau, and Tax Authority. Out of 28 listed companies in the LSM, the annual reports of 22 
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companies are obtained, while the annual reports of 23 the big non-listed companies are obtained 
based on the classification of the Audit Bureau. Our sample is drawn from both listed (98 reports) 
and non-listed (95 reports) firms. The sample of non-listed firms is selected from data obtained from 
the Audit Bureau. The period (2006-2010) is selected due to the following reasons. Firstly, 2006 is 
chosen because it witnessed the emergence of the LSM. Secondly, 2010 is selected as it was the last 
year that annual reports were available at time of data collection. Thirdly, due to the Libyan uprising 
which started in 2011, annual reports from 2011 onwards are not available. A total of 211 annual 
reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial1) usable annual reports.  
 
4.2 Variable measurement and model specification  
4.2.1 Dependent variable: construction of the disclosure index  
A disclosure index is identified as a checklist of selected information items that are expected to appear 
in companies’ annual reports in a single country or across countries (Cooke, 1989a, Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). The majority of previous corporate disclosure studies have used this measurement 
index (Cooke, 1989a, Meek et al., 1995, Akhtaruddin, 2005, Aljifri, 2008, Hassan et al., 2009, 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009, Omar and Simon, 2011). The disclosure index can consist of 
mandatory and/or voluntary informational items. There are two types of indices, namely weighted 
and un-weighted indices. Since, there is no general theory regarding the selection of items to be 
included in a disclosure index, prior research has inclined to consider a wide number of relevant 
information items. 
 
Due to the fact that, there is a lack of a theoretical framework regarding the choice and selection of 
items to be included in a disclosure index, and the absence of a uniform set of accounting standards 
in  Libya, extant government regulations and laws have been used to construct the disclosure index. 
As this part of the study does not focus on a specific user group, an un-weighted index is applied. The 
following rules are used to build a comprehensive index: the items required by statutory regulations 
(for example ITL, LCL and BL); a review of relevant disclosure literature to identify items specific 
to this study; and items included in the annual reports published by Libyan companies (e.g., Elmagrhi 
et al., 2016, Laksmana, 2008, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013, Samaha 
et al., 2012, Samaha et al., 2015, Wang and Hussainey, 2013). 
 
                                                          
1 Non-financial: 65 annual reports from manufacturing sector and 63 annual reports from services sector.  
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This resulted in an index, consisting of 141 information items divided into mandatory and voluntary 
items. The mandatory list (MD) consists of 33 items, whilst the voluntary list (VD) is made up of 108 
items that are expected to be disclosed in annual reports of Libyan firms. A binary coding scheme is 
used in which the presence of an item is scored 1, otherwise 0 and thus, with this unweighted scoring, 
the higher a firm’s score, the better its disclosure will seem to be and vice-versa. 
 
4.2.2 Reliability and validity of the disclosure index  
The reliability of a measurement tool refers to its ability to provide similar results to measure 
disclosure, when applied by different researchers (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Omar and Simon 
(2011) argue that the reliability of using disclosure indices may have some issues, such as scoring 
non-disclosed items. Therefore, in order to improve the reliability of the study’s disclosure index, the 
final index is subject to review by three accounting specialists, one of them in the area of disclosure 
and transparency and two accountants in the LSM. These reviews resulted in adding four voluntary 
items and eliminating other seven items.     
 
In addition each report was reviewed twice, firstly, for familiarisation of the firm’s business and 
activities and relevance of the index to the firm. The reliability of this index was piloted for a sample 
of 40 annual reports. Secondly, the annual reports were scored again to ensure consistency with the 
original scoring. The relevance of mandatory items was determined by Libyan legislation (LCL, ITL 
and BL), whilst voluntary items were considered appropriate unless irrelevant to activities. 
 
4.2.3 Regression model  
A linear-multiple OLS regression was employed to examine the association between the independent 
variables of corporate governance attributes and ownership structure and the dependent variable of 
corporate disclosure. As the dependent variable in this paper is divided into mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure, three regression models are employed for each of mandatory disclosure, voluntary 
disclosure and overall combined disclosure. The estimated regression models are presented as 
follows: 
 
MD = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + 
β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + 
β17AudTyp + β18Year + e                                                                                                               ... (1) 
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VD = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + 
β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + 
β17AudTyp + β18Year + e                                                                                                               ... (2) 
 
ODL = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + 
β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + 
β17AudTyp + β18YD + e                                                                                                                 ... (3) 
 
where, 
MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; ODL is the overall disclosure level; 
β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the board 
composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn is foreign 
ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is 
director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is listing 
status; IndTyp is industry type; AudTyp is auditor type, YD is the year; and e is the error term. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The explanatory variables: a summary of the definition and measurement of the variables used in this 
paper are shown in Table 2. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 3 illustrates the descriptive statistics of the variables. The table indicates that the level of 
average MD approximately 77% with a minimum score of 22 items and maximum score of 32 items 
out of the overall 33 mandatory items required by the Libyan authorities. It can be said that the level 
of compliance of the Libyan firms with the mandatory requirements is 77% representing a weak 
compliance with the Libyan laws and regulations. Although, the level of compliance with MD is high 
(77%), it is still lower than the finding of Kribat et al. (2013) who reported the level of MD to be 
89%. Broadly speaking, the average compliance level with MD is low comparing with previous 
studies (Glaum and Street, 2003, Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003, Omar and Simon, 2011, Gao and Kling, 
2012). However, this finding compares favourably to Akhtaruddin (2005) where the mean score was 
43.53%. 
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With regard to the VD, Table 3 indicates that the extent of VD in the annual reports of the Libyan 
firms is 65% with a minimum score 59 items and maximum score of 85 items out of 108 voluntary 
information items included in the disclosure index. The extent of VD is higher when compared with 
the findings of Kribat et al. (2013), who reported a low level of voluntary disclosure. The evident 
increase in VD in this study clearly shows the impact of the LSM on disclosure practices in the 
country. Surprisingly, the average level of VD (65%) is high when compared with previous studies 
(Hossain and Hammami, 2009, Adelopo, 2011, Omar and Simon, 2011, Madi et al., 2014). The 
overall disclosure level is nearly 68% with a minimum score of 81 items and maximum of 114 items 
out of the total of 141 items of the disclosure index. There has been a steady increase in corporate 
disclosures MD, VD and ODL over time, consistent with previous studies (Omar and Simon, 2011). 
This steady increase is also articulated in Kribat et al. (2013), who focused on Libyan banks, as well 
as agency, legitimacy, resource dependence and stakeholder theoretical predictions, which indicate 
that firms may choose to improve trust of stockholders, powerful stakeholders such as government 
and employers, by engaging in mandatorily and voluntarily disclosures to signal their performance 
and management quality to investors and comply with government reforms, which may help in 
acquiring resources from the external environment. Regarding the independent variables, the average 
board size is 8 members and ranges between 3 and 14 members. Approximately 36% of companies’ 
CEOs serve as board chairmen and the mean percentage of NEDs on the board is approximately 15%. 
The average of board frequency of meetings is 6 meetings per year with a minimum of 3 meetings 
and a maximum of 12 meetings annually. Similarly, approximately 54% of the sample firms have an 
audit committee. Concerning ownership structure variables, Table 3 shows that foreign investors own 
an average of 23% of the firms’ shares, while the government owns an average of 31% of the firms’ 
shares. On average, institutional investors own what is equal to 30% of the chosen sample. Directors 
hold 34% of the outstanding shares. 
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
The average firm size measured by the natural log of total assets is 237.36 million Libyan Dinar (LD) 
ranging widely from 34.856 to 986.754 million LD. The Skewness of firm size variable is alleviated 
by utilizing natural logarithm of size in the regression analysis, in line with prior studies (Glaum and 
Street, 2003, Hossain and Hammami, 2009). Firm age for the whole sample ranges from 7 to 39 years 
with a mean of 22 years. Gearing ranges widely from 12% to 54% with an average of 32.51%. 
Profitability measured by return on equity (ROE) ranges from 22% to 51% with a mean of 41%. The 
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overall liquidity (current ratio) is 25.5%. Table 3 also shows that half the sampled firms are listed in 
the LSM. With regard to the industry type, 34% of the chosen sample is financial firms, while 66% 
are non-financial firms (manufacturing and services), and the annual reports of 52% of our sampled 
firms are audited by big audit 4 firms with an international affiliation with foreign auditing firms. 
 
5.2 Correlation analysis  
An initial diagnostic analysis of our variables is conducted to test the assumption of the inferential 
analysis. There are a number of assumptions that should be tested before performing our OLS model 
analysis. Pearson's product moment correlations test is performed to assess if there is a correlation 
between the study’s variables. Table 4 shows the correlation analysis between all variables of the 
study. Since there is no high correlation among the variables, our analysis shows that there is no 
serious multicollinearity problem present among the independent variables. In addition to this, 
regression diagnostics, including Q-Q normality plots, histograms of all dependent variable, scatter 
plots of residuals against the predicted values, and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov Z-test for each 
independent and dependent variable are performed for normality, linearity and homoscedasticity 
assumptions (Cooke, 1993, Neter et al., 1996, Cooke, 1998). The results show no statistically harmful 
violation of any of these assumptions. 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
From an overall view of corporate disclosure in the Libyan context, Table 4 shows that board size, 
board composition, frequency of meetings, audit committee, foreign ownership, firm size, gearing, 
profitability, listing status, industry type and auditor type are significantly and positively correlated 
with the overall disclosure level ODL. The univariate analysis supports our hypotheses H1 (BoardS), 
H3 (BoCo), H4 (FreMee), H5 (AuCo) and H6 (ForOwn). These findings of correlations are compatible 
with previous studies H1, H4, H5 and H6 (Barako et al., 2006, Samaha et al., 2012, Ntim et al., 2013), 
while H3 is inconsistent with Eng and Mak (2003). On the other hand, role duality DualP and 
government ownership GovOwn are negatively correlated with the ODL. These findings support H2 
consistent with Samaha et al. (2012) and Wang and Hussainey (2013), and H7 consistent with 
Ebrahim and Fattah (2015) and (Dam and Scholtens, 2012) 
 
Table 4 also shows that, with regard to MD, there is a statistically significant correlation between MD 
and the explanatory variables and control variables. It shows that frequency of board meetings, audit 
committee, gearing, profitability, listing status, industry type and auditor type are positively and 
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significantly correlated with MD, while role duality and government ownership are negatively 
correlated with MD. For the VD, all corporate governance variables, foreign ownership, government 
ownership, firm size, gearing, profitability, listing status, industry type and auditor type are linked to 
the extent of VD. All these explanatory variables are significantly and positively correlated with the 
extent of VD except role duality and government ownership where they are negatively correlated with 
the extent of VD in Libyan firms’ annual reports.  
 
5.3 Multivariate regression results and discussion 
To recap, our study aims to study the association between corporate governance attributes and 
ownership structure variables and the extent of corporate disclosure. To achieve this aim, a multiple 
linear regression is used to examine if there is any association between the explanatory variables and 
the extent of corporate disclosure. The results of the regression analysis of the determinants of 
corporate disclosure are shown in Table 5. In this paper, corporate disclosure is divided into three 
types, namely MD, VD and overall ODL (mandatory + voluntary). Columns 2, 3 and 4 present the 
results of the employed OLS regression for the three regression models. MD requirements are 
considered as the main drivers for firms to comply with these requirements rather than their own 
decisions. On the other hand, within VD firms have the right to disclose or not depending on such 
factor as corporate governance structure, ownership structure and organisational attributes. Therefore, 
the results associated with Model 3 (ODL) are considered for the acceptance or rejection of our 
hypotheses. 
 
The results presented in Table 5 show that approximately 54%, 85% and 82% of the variation in the 
disclosure index (MD, VD and ODL, respectively) between the sample companies can be explained 
by the nine independent variables with the inclusion of eight firm characteristics as control variables. 
These results in social science research are considered highly acceptable, as they are above 20% 
(Anderson et al., 1993, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003, Aljifri et al., 2014). Also, these results are 
considered favourable compared with similar studies applying disclosure indices,  such as Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) at 46%, Akhtaruddin (2005) at 56% and Samaha et al. (2012) at 62%. 
 
Generally, the results indicate that corporate governance variables are associated with the ODL. 
Firstly, and for the board size, the analysis finds that the coefficient estimate on BoardS is negative 
and statistically significant with the ODL at the 5% level. As such, based on this empirical finding 
the researchers reject hypothesis H1 that firms with large board size disclose more information than 
those with smaller board size. This finding provides evidence that small boards of directors are more 
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effective and supports the findings of Yermack (1996), and is also consistent with the findings 
reported by Byard et al. (2006). Conversely, this finding contradicts the findings of Beasley (1996) 
and Samaha et al. (2015), who reported a significant and positive association between board size and 
the extent of disclosure. Theoretically, this is consistent with the predictions of agency theory, which 
suggests that larger boards are associated with poor communication, co-ordination and free-riding 
problems, often leading to poor monitoring of corporate executives, and thereby impacting negatively 
on corporate disclosures. It is, however, not compatible with the predictions of resource dependence 
and stakeholder theories, which suggest that larger boards are likely to engage in higher levels of 
disclosure because of greater stakeholder pressure that is often associated with larger boards.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Secondly, and with regard to hypothesis H2, the study does not find any significant association 
between CEO role duality and the ODL. This result is in line with the studies that found no significant 
association between the extent of disclosure and role duality, such as Arcay and Muiño (2005), 
Barako et al. (2006), Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006). In relation to 
the theoretical underpinnings, this finding is not compatible with agency, stakeholder theories and 
resource-dependence theory, in which they assume duality in position of CEO can have a negative 
impact on corporate performance and disclosure as stated above in the development of the hypothesis. 
For the board composition, the study finds that the coefficient estimate on BoCo is negative and 
statistically significant with the overall disclosure level at the 5% level. This finding rejects 
hypothesis H3. This finding is in line with the findings of Eng and Mak (2003) and Barako et al. 
(2006) who reported the same negative association, and inconsistent with the findings of Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) and Samaha et al. (2015). This negative association contradicts with the theoretical 
underpinnings driven from agency, stakeholder and legitimacy theory. This contradiction may be 
related to the cultural influence in such countries, where appointing independent non-executive 
directors relies heavily on the social environment instead of competency. For frequency of board 
meetings (FreMee), the analysis finds that the coefficient estimate of FreMee is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level with the ODL. As anticipated, this finding lends support to 
hypothesis H4. Theoretically, this is in line with the positive prediction which suggests that a higher 
frequency of board meetings contributes towards improving the quality of managerial monitoring 
leading to a positive influence on corporate disclosure.  
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Thirdly, and in relation to the existence of an audit committee AuCo, our findings suggest that there 
is a significant positive association between AuCo and the ODL at the 1% level (0.001). Therefore, 
the researchers accept hypothesis H5. Our findings regarding the role of audit committee in explaining 
the ODL is consistent with Ho and Shun (2001), Barako et al. (2006), and Samaha et al. (2015). 
Theoretically, this finding supports the prediction of agency theory, which assumes that the existence 
of an audit committee helps firms to reduce agency costs particularly if it is dominated by non-
executive directors. With regard to the ownership structure variables, Table 5 does not show any 
evidence regarding the association between ownership structure variables (ForOwn, GovOwn, 
InstOwn and DirOwn) and the ODL neither MD nor VD. Therefore, our results do not support 
hypotheses H6, H7, H8 and H9. Our results are in line with Ghazali and Weetman (2006) who found 
there is no association between ownership structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure in 
Malaysia. The rejection of hypothesis H8 is not in line with the findings of Barako et al. (2006) and 
Ntim et al (2012a, b).  
 
Theoretically, the finding related to H6 contradicts with the prediction from an agency theory 
perspective, which suggests that ownership becomes dispersed as result of an increase in the number 
shareholders, allowing an increase in foreign ownership, leading to an increase in the demands for 
more information disclosure. For H7, the finding is consistent with the argument that firms with higher 
state ownership can easily obtain funding from government, so these firms attract investors with less 
incentive to disclose more information. Regarding institutional ownership H8, the finding contradicts 
with agency, stakeholders and legitimacy theory, which all of them agree on that managers disclose 
more information to meet the informational needs of institutional shareholders as influential 
stakeholders (stakeholder theory) and gain their support to justify their continued stewardship. The 
rejection of H9 does not support the prediction of agency theory which postulates that firms with 
higher proportion of director ownership are associated with less information asymmetry between the 
principal and the agent. Our findings in relation to the control variables conclude that, firm size (FS), 
gearing (Gear) and profitability (Prof) are not associated with and the ODL, while firm age (FA), 
liquidity (Liq), listing status (List) and industry type (IndTyp) are statistically associated with the 
ODL. Finally, the analysis finds that the coefficient estimates on auditor type (AudTyp) is positive but 
not statistically significant with the ODL at the 10% level (0.082). 
 
Regarding the disaggregated level (MD and VD), Table 5 shows that, for the MD, two out of the five 
corporate governance variables (BoardS and BoCo) are negatively associated with the MD at the 5% 
and 10% level, respectively, while only frequency of board meetings (FreMee) is positively 
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associated with the MD at the 10% level. For the VD, consistent with the MD, board Size (BoardS) 
and board composition (BoCo) are found to be negatively associated with the VD at 10% and 5% 
level, respectively, while frequency of board meetings (FreMee) and audit committee (AuCo) are 
significantly and positively associated with the VD at the 1% level. Consistent with the ODL, Table 
5 indicates that ownership variables (ForOwn, GovOwn, InstOwn and DirOwn) are not associated 
with neither the MD nor the VD.  
 
Our findings in relation to the control variables suggest that, the coefficient estimate on firm size (FS) 
is found to be positively significant at the 1% (0.007) level only with the level of VD. This finding is 
supported by the evidence of Hassan et al. (2006) suggesting that FS has a negative influence on MD 
but a positive impact on VD. On the other hand, this contradicts with the findings of Meek et al. 
(1995) and Ntim et al. (2012a). For firm age (FA), the coefficient estimate is found to be positively 
associated with the VD and the ODL at the 5% (0.088) and 10% (0.094) level respectively. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Hossain and Hammami (2009). For gearing the coefficient 
estimate is only positively associated with the MD at the 5% (0.030) level. Similarly, the coefficient 
estimate on profitability (Prof) is found to be positively significant only with the MD at the 5% (0.020) 
level. Table 5 also shows that, liquidity (Liq), listing status (List) and industry type (IndTyp) are 
positively and significantly associated with both MD (0.000, 0.015 and 0.000, respectively) and VD 
disclosure (0.002, 0.014 and 0.000 respectively).  
 
In addition, the two regression models are employed by splitting our sample into listed and non-listed 
companies. Table 6 indicates that, for listed companies, consistent with our primary findings in Table 
5, board size (BoardS) is negatively and statistically significant with the ODL at the 5% level. 
Frequency of board meetings (FreMee) and audit committee (AuCo) are found to be positively and 
statistically significant with the ODL at the 1% level, the same as those reported in Table 5. With 
regard to non-listed companies, board composition (BoCo) and frequency of meetings (FreMee) are 
statistically significant with the ODL at the 1% and 5% level, negatively and positively, respectively. 
For ownership variables, noticeably, the results presented in Table 6 are generally similar to those 
presented by OLS in Table 5, where no evidence of association is found. 
 
5.4 Additional analyses  
The researchers conducted a number of additional analyses to check the robustness of the results. A 
large volume of recent studies seeking to address apparent concerns of endogeneity within the 
accounting and finance literature is highlighting this issue for further investigation (Brown et al., 
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2011, Gippel et al., 2015). Firstly, instrumental variable is created using an alternative weighted index 
to test for endogeneity. Although, all 141 items are weighted equally, the number of items varies 
across the sub-groups of MD, VD and ODL. This variation leads to differences in the assigned weights 
for each group. Therefore, to deal with this issue, an alternative MD, VD and ODL, in which each 
group is assigned an equal weight to the total. For example, MD consists of two groups in which 50 
per cent is awarded to each group. Our results are presented in Table 6 in Columns 7, 8 and 9. The 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 5. Board size (BoardS), frequency of meetings 
(FreMee) and audit committee (AuCo) are statistically significant with the ODL. With regard to 
ownership variables, the results in Table 6 confirm the primary results reported in Table 5 with no 
evidence of association (apart from observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of the 
coefficients). This suggests that our evidence is largely robust to sub-groups estimations. 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Secondly, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is employed to check for any potential endogeneity. To 
ensure that the 2SLS is appropriate, the analysis first regresses the unstandardized predicted values 
against the unstandardized residuals to check any potential correlation (Elmagrhi et al., 2016, Larcker 
and Rusticus, Ntim et al., 2013, Sun et al., 2015). The researchers employ their predicted parts as 
instruments and re-estimate the three primary equations MD, VD and ODL. The results did not find 
any evidence of significant correlation between the unstandardized predicted values and the 
unstandardized residuals. The results of 2SLS are presented in Table 6 in Columns 10, 11 and 12. The 
results indicate that board size (BoardS) is statistically significant with the ODL. With regard to 
ownership variables, the results in Table 6 confirm the primary results reported in Table 5 with no 
evidence of association except for government ownership (GovOwn) with a statistically significant 
association at the 1% level with the ODL (apart from observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude 
of the coefficients). 
 
Thirdly, we separated our sample into financial and non-financial companies as suggested by prior 
research (Elmagrhi et al., 2016, Ntim et al., 2013). Table 7 indicates that, for non-financial companies, 
consistent with our primary findings in Table 5, board size (BoardS) is negatively and statistically 
significant with the ODL at the 5% level. Frequency of board meetings (FreMee) and audit committee 
(AuCo) are found to be positively and statistically significant with the ODL at the 1% level, the same 
as those reported in Table 5. With regard to financial companies, board size (BoardS), and role duality 
(DualP) are positively and statistically significant with the ODL at the 5% level. For ownership 
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variables, apparently, the results presented in Table 7 are generally similar to those presented by OLS 
in Table 5, where no evidence of association is found. Interestingly, Table 7 indicates that foreign 
ownership (ForOwn) and institutional ownership (InstOwn) are positively and statistically significant 
with the ODL at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
Finally, Previous studies argued that there is a non-linear relationship between board characteristics 
and ownership variables and corporate disclosure practices (Sun et al., 2015, Elmagrhi et al., 2016). 
To detect the presence of non-linear relationships between corporate governance variables and the 
extent of corporate disclosure, this study re-estimate the ODL by including the squared values of 
BoardS2, ForOwn2, GovOwn2, InstOwn2 and DirOwn2. The last Column in Table 6 presents the 
results of the non-linear model NLM. The coefficients on BoardS2, GovOwn2, and InstOwn2 are 
statistically insignificant. However, the coefficients on ForOwn2 and DirOwn2 are significant 
indicating an evidence of non-linearity between these two variables and the dependent variable ODL. 
The findings of the remaining variables are still the same as our findings in Table 5 (apart from 
observable minor sensitivities in the magnitude of the coefficients). As a result, these findings support 
the probability of the presence of non-linearity link only between ForOwn2 and DirOwn2 and the 
ODL. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Although, a large volume of empirical research has focused on the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure practices, limited studies have focused on 
developing countries. This paper sought to empirically investigate the association between corporate 
governance characteristics and ownership structure and corporate disclosure behaviour, and 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence on this association from a sample of large firms in 
the Libyan context. This is the first paper to investigate the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on corporate disclosure practices with a focus on listed and non-listed firms, including 
financial and non-financial ones in Libya, as well as both mandatory and voluntary disclosures.   
 
With regard to the extent of corporate disclosure, our findings indicate that the level of overall 
disclosure is generally low at nearly 68%. In relation to mandatory disclosure, firms fail to fully 
comply with the minimum level required by the Libyan authorities. Generally, the results suggest that 
the corporate governance variables are significant in explaining the extent of corporate disclosure. To 
start with, board size and board composition are found to be negatively related to the overall 
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disclosure level, while frequency of meetings and audit committee have a positive and statistically 
significant association with the overall disclosure level. To some extent, these findings of corporate 
governance characteristics are surprising in the Libyan context, in which the related laws are weak in 
governing the corporate governance practices. With regard to ownership structure variables, including 
foreign, government, institutional and director ownership, no relation found between these variables 
and the overall level of disclosure. Despite the changes taking place during the investigated period 
(2006-2010) when the Libyan economy started to witness a huge transfer of the ownership of 
government enterprises to private investors “Privatization”, none of the ownership variables were 
found to support the agency relationship in the Libyan context. With regard to firm’s characteristics, 
the results find that liquidity, listing status and industry type have a positive and significant 
relationship with the overall disclosure level. Firm age and auditor type have positive but not 
statistically significant impact on the level of disclosure. 
 
This paper extends, as well as make a number of new contributions to the extant literature. Firstly, 
and unlike most prior studies that have examined how firm-level characteristics, such as firm size and 
industry, affect corporate disclosure behaviour, the current study examines how corporate boards, 
executives and owners in addition to firm-level features drive the level of corporate disclosure. Thus, 
this contributes to a small, but gradually increasing number of studies that have evaluated the effect 
of corporate governance and ownership structures on the level of corporate  disclosure (Barako et al., 
2006, Eng and Mak, 2003, Ntim et al., 2012a, b, 2013, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b). Secondly, 
distinct from prior studies that have focused mainly on examining the determinants of only voluntary 
disclosure, the researchers examine the antecedents of both mandatory and voluntary disclosures. 
Finally, distinct from most prior studies, our analyses cover both listed and non-listed firms, and 
thereby allowing us to provide new empirical insights relating to the disclosure behaviour of both 
listed and non-listed firms in one of developing countries.   
 
Furthermore, this paper’s results have a number of implications. First, the results show that the 
disclosure level varies substantially among the Libyan listed and unlisted firms. This provides Libyan 
authorities with a vigorous motivation to strengthen legal enforcement more by enhancing CG and 
disclosure by establishing a compliance committee. This implies that Libyan authorities should 
consider imposing further mandatory requirements on Libyan firms to further protect investors and 
to avoid negative effects that may arise from non-disclosure compliance. The results reveal that 
ownership concentration hinder the process of disclosing more transparent information in general. 
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This implies that Libyan policymakers may need to seek to implement further requirements on Libyan 
firms to further protect minority shareholders. 
 
The researches’ results support the directors’ role in improving the process of disclosing more 
information rather than mandating of disclosure. However, the findings reveal a need for further 
enhancements in the Libyan context. The results rationalize the controversy over the influence 
improved CG has on disclosure practices, in general, and particularly within the Libyan context, 
which may lead Libyan policymakers to implement more CG reforms. Investors may also rely on 
such CG characteristics (e.g., board size and board independence) to shape expectations about the 
voluntary and/or mandatory information that is revealed. Our results shed new insights on the 
importance of corporate governance mechanisms in improving disclosure and accountability. Finally, 
evidence provided in this paper offers potential theoretical and empirical insights for future studies. 
In terms of theoretical implication, the results indicate that future studies may arguably improve their 
theoretical insights by relying on the other closely related theories, including neo-institutional, and 
stewardship theories, when exploring variables, which can influence CG and disclosure practices 
compliance. 
 
There is an opportunity for future research to investigate disclosure practices using other channels of 
corporate disclosure such as corporate websites; to investigate if they have the same explanatory 
variables as annual reports. Future research, in Libya, could extend the sample size as the sample size 
for this study was limited by data availability and constraints of manual data collection. Useful 
insights may be offered also by future studies by conducting in-depth interviews with corporate 
managers, directors and owners regarding these issues. A comparative study with other countries in 
the region, with alternative or more advanced accounting and governance practices would provide an 
opportunity for further research. These suggestions offer a useful insight into disclosure practices by 
Libyan firms and provide a starting point for future research that might be necessary to deal with on-
going changes that are likely to reverberate for many years to come. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Selection Process 
 Number of firms Number of observations 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
130 
20 
100 
650 
100 
500 
Initial sample 250 1250 
Criteria leading to exclusion of firms:   
Less:  
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
 
115 
4 
86 
 
575 
20 
430 
Small and medium companies (205) (1025) 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
15 
16 
14 
75 
80 
70 
Big companies 45 225 
Less:  
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
 
2 
3 
2 
 
10 
15 
7 
Missing data (7) (32) 
Industrials 
Financial  
Services 
13 
13 
13 
65 
65 
63 
=Final sample 39 193 
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Table 2: Definition and measurement of variables 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Description 
Predict
ed sign 
Data source 
Dependent 
variable  
    
MD Total mandatory disclosure Percentage of scored mandatory disclosure  Annual reports 
VD Total voluntary disclosure  Percentage of scored voluntary disclosure  Annual reports 
ODL Overall disclosure level 
(mandatory and voluntary) 
Percentage of overall applicable disclosure 
items  
 Annual reports 
Independent 
variables 
    
BoardS Board size The number of board members + Board of directors’ report 
DualP  Duality in position Dummy variable; 1 if company’s CEO serves 
as a board chairman, 0 otherwise 
_ Board of directors’ report 
BoCo Board composition Ratio of the number of non-executive directors 
to the total number of the directors 
+ Board of directors’ report 
FreMee Frequency of meetings Number of board meetings during the year + Board of directors’ report 
AuCo Audit committee Dummy variable; 1 if an audit committee 
exists, 0 otherwise 
+ Board of directors’ report 
ForOwn Foreign ownership Foreign ownership to total owners’ ratio + Ownership structure 
information 
GovOwn Government ownership Government ownership to total owners’ ratio + Ownership structure 
information 
InstOwn Institutional ownership Institutional ownership to total owners’ ratio + Ownership structure 
information 
DirOwn Director ownership The percentage of shares outstanding held by 
the board of directors 
- Ownership structure 
information 
Control 
variable 
    
FS Firm size Measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets 
+ Annual report: Financial 
statements 
FA Firm age Number of years since foundation + Annual report: Financial 
statements 
Gearing Gearing Measured by the ratio of total debt to equity + Annual report: Financial 
statements 
Prof Profitability Return on equity = net profit/total 
shareholders’ equity 
+ Annual report: Financial 
statements 
Liq Liquidity Measured as the ratio of company’s current 
assets to current liabilities 
+ Annual report: Financial 
statements 
List Listing status 1 if the company is listed and 0 otherwise + General information 
IndTyp Industry type 1 = Financial (banks or insurance), 0 = Non-
financial (manufacturing and service) 
+ General information 
AudTyp Auditor type 1 = a company audited by one of  the big four 
with international affiliation (Big Four), 0 = a 
company audited by local auditor without 
international affiliation 
+ Auditor report 
YD Year  Dummies for each of the five years 2006 - 2010  Annual report  
Notation: A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial) usable annual reports for listed and 
non-listed Libyan companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit Bureau, 
and Tax Authority. Variables are defined as follows: MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; ODL is the 
overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the board composition; 
FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn is foreign ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; 
GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; 
Lis is listing status; IndTyp is industry type and AudTyp is auditor type. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for dependent, independent and control variables 
Variables  Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum N 
MD 
Dependent 
76.97 .0669 2.2082 22.00 32.00 193 
VD 65.13 .0604 6.5253 59.00 85.00 193 
ODL 67.90 .0594 8.3775 81.00 114.00 193 
Boards 
Independent 
8.0466 8.000 2.4479 3.00 14.00 193 
DualP 0.3575 0.000 0.4805 .00 1.00 193 
BoCo 0.1518 0.1666 0.1164 .00 .43 193 
FreMee 6.2073 6.000 1.5905 3.00 12.00 193 
AuCo 0.5389 1.000 0.4997 .00 1.00 193 
ForOwn 0.2316 0.2500 0.1973 .00 0.75 193 
GovOwn 0.3145 0.3000 0.2504 .00 1.00 193 
InstOwn 0.2985 0.2500 0.2023 .00 0.75 193 
DirOwn 0.3415 0.2700 0.2845 .00 0.46 193 
FS 
Control 
237.36 19.12 217.212 34.856 986.754 193 
FA 0.2235 23.0000 7.850 7.00 39.00 193 
Gearing 0.3251 0.3340 0.0755 .12 0.54 193 
Prof 0.4109 0.4010 0.0956 .22 0.51 193 
Liq 0.2548 0.2515 0.0996 .04 0.45 193 
List 0.5078 1.000 0.5012 .00 1.00 193 
IndTyp 0.3368 1.000 0.4738 .00 1.00 193 
AudTyp 0.5233 1.000 0.5007 .00 1.00 193 
Notation: A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial) usable annual reports for listed 
and non-listed Libyan companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit 
Bureau, and Tax Authority. Variables are defined as follows: MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; 
ODL is the overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the board 
composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn is foreign ownership; InstOwn is 
institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is 
profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is listing status; IndTyp is industry type and AudTyp is auditor type. 
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Table 4: Correlations matrix of all variable 
 
Notation: *, ** significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels (2−tailed) respectively. A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial) usable annual reports for listed and non-listed Libyan 
companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit Bureau, and Tax Authority.Variables are defined as follows: MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary 
disclosure; ODL is the overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the board composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; 
ForOwn is foreign ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is listing status; 
IndTyp is industry type and AudTyp is auditor type. 
 
 
 
 MD VD ODL BoardS DualP BoCo FreMee AuCo ForOwn GovOwn InstOwn DirOwn FS FA Gearing Prof Liq List IndTyp AudTyp 
MD 
1.000                    
VD 
.831** 1.000                   
ODL 
.897** .990** 1.000                  
BoardS 
.166* .301** .279** 1.000                 
DualP -
.220** 
-.246** -.249** -.172* 1.000                
BoCo 
.154* .277** .257** .124 -.032 1.000               
FreMee 
.234** .377** .357** .304** -.147* .192** 1.000              
AuCo 
.265** .393** .373** .064 -.112 .135 .244** 1.000             
ForOwn 
.175* .245** .235** -.030 -.077 .018 .022 .127 1.000            
GovOwn -
.330** 
-.397** -.394** -.170* .107 -.072 -.168* -.109 -.441** 1.000           
InstOwn 
.002 -.022 -.018 .043 .040 -.192** .060 -.116 -.315** -.320** 1.000          
DirOwn 
.031 .073 .068 .103 -.030 .424** .086 .029 .153* -.276** -.025 1.000         
FS 
.136 .293** .264** .040 -.131 .068 .158* .248** .319** -.001 -.196** -.251** 1.000        
FA 
.059 .110 .109 -.117 -.029 .220** -.054 -.081 .056 -.166* .007 .228** .097 1.000       
Gearing 
.265** .275** .281** .105 -.038 .100 .166* .011 .099 .020 -.323** -.119 .331** -.072 1.000      
Prof 
.440** .489** .492** .233** -.215** .142* .065 .267** .216** -.226** -.056 -.035 .268** .056 .061 1.000     
Liq 
.040 -.109 -.070 -.089 .023 .082 -.108 -.041 -.070 .063 -.110 .187** -.124 .148* -.137 -.156* 1.000    
List 
.560** .631** .635** .440** -.304** .285** .278** .150* .162* -.450** -.034 .189** .120 .012 .266** .342** -.146* 1.000   
IndTyp 
.383** .470** .455** .231** -.074 -.027 -.007 .109 .108 -.084 -.067 -.259** .309** -.119 .301** .437** -.518** .373** 1.000  
AudTyp 
.574** .727** .715** .398** -.327** .303** .362** .220** .243** -.473** .069 .153* .180* .108 .190** .403** -.130 .720** .285** 1.000 
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Table 5: Regression analysis of the determinants of corporate disclosure 
Notation: A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial) usable annual reports for 
listed and non-listed Libyan companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company 
websites, Audit Bureau, and Tax Authority. The table above provides OLS for each type of disclosure for the three models 
presented below: 
 
MD = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + 
β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + β17AudTyp + β18Year + e                                                                    
 
VD = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + 
β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + β17AudTyp + β18Year + e                                                                   
 
ODL = β0 + β1Boards + β2DualP + β3BoCo + β4FreMee + β5AuCo + β6ForOwn + β7InstOwn + β8GovOwn + β9DirOwn + 
β10FS + β11FA + β12Gaering + β13Prof + β14Liq + β15Lis + β16IndTyp + β17AudTyp + β18YD + e                                                         
 
T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Coefficients 
are in front of parenthesis. Variables are defined as follows: MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; 
ODL is the overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the 
board composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn is foreign ownership; 
InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is 
firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is listing status; IndTyp is industry type; AudTyp is auditor type and YD is 
the year dummy variable. The sample consists of 193 observations. 
 
 
 
Variable 
construct 
MD VD ODL 
Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value Coefficients P-value 
Corporate governance variables 
BoardS -.122 .035** -.059 .079* -.078 .032** 
DualP -.011 .834 .051 .101 .037 .276 
BoCo -.118 .065* -.076 .038** -.091 .024** 
FreMee .103 .076* .140 .000*** .137 .000*** 
AuCo .081 .153 .113 .001*** .110 .002*** 
Ownership structure variables 
ForOwn -.001 .988 -.012 .803 -.009 .854 
GovOwn .085 .275 -.056 .211 -.021 .663 
InstOwn .026 .766 -.017 .737 -.006 .909 
DirOwn -.019 .777 .024 .524 .014 .736 
Control variables 
FS -.077 .291 .114 .007*** .069 .133 
FA .060 .284 .055 .088** .058 .094* 
Gearing .132 .030** -.005 .877 .031 .418 
Prof .152 .020** .020 .594 .055 .173 
Liq .264 .000*** .114 .002*** .158 .000*** 
List .204 .015** .118 .014** .146 .005*** 
IndTyp .537 .000*** .512 .000*** .540 .000*** 
AudTyp .219 .059** .081 .225 .121 .096* 
YD Included   Included  Included  
Std. error .04519 .02345 .02510 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.568 1.666 1.620 
F-value 10.954 48.069 39.436 
R²  Adj. .544 .849 .822 
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Table 6: Additional analyses of the effects of corporate governance and ownership on corporate disclosure practices of Libyan firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
construct 
Listed  Non-listed  Weighted Index  2SLS NLM 
MD VD ODL MD VD ODL MD VD ODL MD VD ODL ODL 
Corporate governance variables 
BoardS 
.043** 
-.201 
.024** 
-.102 
.014** 
-.138 
.194 
-.118 
.469 
-.050 
.323 
-.071 
.039** 
-.119 
.084* 
-.067 
.035** 
-.081 
.743 
-.308 
.021** 
-1.283 
.072* 
-1.081 
.543 
.148 
BoardS2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.364 
-.220 
DualP 
.379 
-.082 
.001*** 
.149 
.089* 
.090 
.967 
.004 
.338 
-.072 
.464 
-.057 
.662 
-.024 
.118 
.057 
.231 
.043 
.877 
-.594 
.025** 
-5.093 
.093* 
-4.124 
.480 
.025 
BoCo 
.769 
-.032 
.650 
-.022 
.664 
-.026 
.004*** 
-.329 
.027** 
-.195 
.008*** 
-.243 
.128 
-.097 
.264 
-.048 
.156 
-.061 
.890 
-.039 
.059** 
.316 
.191 
.236 
.009*** 
-.109 
FreMee 
.238 
.123 
.000*** 
.178 
.004*** 
.174 
.323 
.096 
.038** 
.157 
.053** 
.151 
.097* 
.096 
.002*** 
.126 
.001*** 
.126 
.891 
-.220 
.055** 
-1.828 
.148 
-1.482 
.001*** 
.126 
AuCo 
.077* 
.181 
.002*** 
.148 
.004*** 
.168 
.951 
.006 
.074* 
.136 
.158 
.111 
.122 
.088 
.020** 
.090 
.014** 
.094 
.143 
.464 
.502 
.125 
.274 
.220 
.003*** 
.109 
Ownership variables 
ForOwn 
.528 
.076 
.273 
-.060 
.728 
-.024 
.496 
-.108 
.495 
.083 
.758 
.039 
.952 
-.005 
.164 
.072 
.243 
.059 
.716 
-.309 
.019** 
-1.180 
.064* 
-1.001 
.170 
-.161 
ForOwn2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.094* 
.188 
GovOwn 
.102 
.237 
.452 
-.049 
.688 
.033 
.451 
-.107 
.481 
-.077 
.428 
-.089 
.376 
.069 
.646 
-.024 
.906 
-.006 
.016** 
-.292 
.000*** 
-.325 
.000*** 
-.330 
.219 
-.146 
GovOwn2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.183 
.141 
InstOwn 
.591 
.077 
.896 
-.008 
.839 
.016 
.718 
-.057 
.837 
.025 
.967 
.005 
.819 
.020 
.546 
.036 
.559 
.034 
.916 
.096 
.045** 
1.082 
.136 
.868 
.805 
-.026 
InstOwn2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.444 
.075 
DirOwn 
.915 
.014 
.261 
.068 
.452 
.057 
.819 
.025 
.312 
.084 
.389 
.074 
.852 
.012 
.394 
.038 
.434 
.034 
.931 
.233 
.033** 
3.383 
.114 
2.696 
.066* 
.269 
DirOwn2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.088* 
-.254 
Control variables 
FS 
.195 
-.181 
.144 
.093 
.824 
.017 
.317 
-.107 
.249 
.095 
.568 
.049 
.136 
-.104 
.593 
.025 
.996 
.000 
.928 
-.134 
.058** 
1.658 
.183 
1.256 
.101 
.080 
FA 
.523 
.062 
.058** 
.084 
.131 
.083 
.993 
-.001 
.418 
.062 
.531 
.050 
.466 
.041 
.122 
.059 
.123 
.058 
.977 
-.040 
.054** 
-1.581 
.160 
-1.242 
.251 
.042 
Gearing 
.057** 
.210 
.185 
.066 
.069** 
.113 
.516 
.064 
.770 
-.022 
.989 
-.001 
.011** 
.155 
.793 
.011 
.313 
.041 
.709 
.395 
.020** 
1.459 
.066* 
1.241 
.353 
.038 
Prof 
.162 
.164 
.083* 
.093 
.071* 
.120 
.289 
.107 
.198 
-.100 
.511 
-.052 
.038** 
.135 
.904 
.005 
.457 
.032 
.847 
-.152 
.010** 
-1.203 
.052** 
-.977 
.266 
.047 
Liq 
.005*** 
.347 
.031** 
.121 
.005*** 
.196 
.000*** 
.430 
.105 
.138 
.013** 
.223 
.000*** 
.245 
.007*** 
.117 
.001*** 
.149 
.661 
.272 
.154 
-.520 
.396 
-.334 
.000*** 
.181 
List 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.012** 
.210 
.090* 
.095 
.027** 
.124 
.963 
-.093 
.030** 
-2.579 
.112 
-2.034 
.003*** 
.161 
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Notation: T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 
financial and 128 non-financial) usable annual reports for listed and non-listed Libyan companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are collected from the LSM, company 
websites, Audit Bureau, and Tax Authority. Variables are defined as follows: Listed is regression model for listed companies; Non-listed is regression model for non-listed companies; 
Weighted index is instrumental variable created using an alternative weighted index; 2SLS is two-stage least squares; NLM is non-linear model re-estimated by including the squared 
values of BoardS, ForOwn, GovOwn, InstOwn and DirOwn; MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; ODL is the overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant 
term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role duality; BoCo is the board composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; ForOwn is foreign 
ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; 
Lis is listing status; IndTyp is industry type and AudTyp is auditor type. 
 
 
  
IndTyp 
.000*** 
.536 
.000*** 
.575 
.000*** 
.602 
.070* 
.207 
.000*** 
.370 
.000*** 
.352 
.000*** 
.404 
.000*** 
.279 
.000*** 
.318 
.638 
.617 
.002*** 
2.372 
.017** 
2.010 
.000*** 
.429 
AudTyp 
.180 
.139 
.002*** 
.150 
.009*** 
.157 
.222 
.136 
.043** 
.175 
.049** 
.176 
.244 
.101 
.004*** 
.170 
.005*** 
.164 
.956 
-.089 
.032** 
-2.069 
.116 
-1.635 
.001*** 
.182 
YD Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Durbin-Watson 1.728 2.059 1,998 1.983 1.848 1.807 1.700 1.632 1.657 1.670 1.701 1.677 1.781 
F-value 3.768 33.259 20.049 3.656 8.619 7.781 11.335 33.785 34.840 11.697 49.408 41.181 34.299 
Adj. R² 0.363 0.869 0.797 0.372 0.630 0.602 0.542 0.790 0.795 0.539 0.841 0.815 8.18 
N 98 95 193 193 193 
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Table 7: The effects of corporate governance and ownership on corporate disclosure practices of Financial vs. 
Non-financial Libyan firms 
Variable construct 
Financial  Non-financial 
MD VD ODL  MD VD ODL 
Corporate governance variables       
BoardS  0.793  0.009***  0.033**   0.023**  0.031**  0.013** 
  0.028  0.140  0.117  -0.192 -0.105 -0.137 
DualP  0.908  0.002***  0.015**   0.413  0.152  0.182 
  0.009  0.126  0.100  -0.071 -0.072 -0.076 
BoCo  0.571  0.074*  0.102   0.114  0.073*  0.055* 
  0.073  0.115  0.109  -0.154 -0.101 -0.123 
FreMee  0.574  0.093*  0.324   0.153  0.001***  0.004*** 
 -0.057  0.085  0.051   0.119  0.161  0.158 
AuCo  0.299  0.433  0.961   0.165  0.001***  0.005*** 
 -0.112  0.041  0.003   0.118  0.158  0.156 
Ownership structure variables 
ForOwn  0.117  0.002***  0.002***   0.825  0.602  0.652 
  0.294  0.289  0.303  -0.026 -0.035 -0.034 
GovOwn  0.809  0.124  0.298   0.910  0.635  0.789 
 -0.049  0.153  0.106   0.016 -0.038 -0.024 
InstOwn  0.448  0.028**  0.041**   0.782  0.011**  0.064* 
  0.153  0.223  0.214  -0.031 -0.169 -0.139 
DirOwn  0.758  0.209  0.269   0.437  0.671  0.523 
  0.059  0.118  0.107  -0.077 -0.024 -0.041 
Control variables 
FS  0.214  0.592  0.805   0.141  0.363  0.955 
 -0.169  0.035 -0.017  -0.144  0.051 -0.004 
FA  0.780  0.418  0.451   0.420  0.291  0.282 
  0.030  0.043  0.042    0.067  0.050  0.058 
Gearing  0.016**  0.154  0.837   0.949  0.703  0.820 
  0.223 -0.063  0.009   0.006 -0.020 -0.013 
Prof  0.165  0.066*  0.037**   0.272  0.631  0.861 
  0.184  0.120  0.142   0.097 -0.024  0.010 
Liq  0.155  0.086*  0.044**   0.000***  0.002***  0.000*** 
  0.324  0.193  0.235   0.308  0.156  0.210 
List  0.009***  0.079*  0.008***   0.278  0.042**  0.063* 
  0.297  0.096  0.153   0.133  0.144  0.150 
AudTyp  0.841  0.001***  0.006***   0.096*  0.118  0.071* 
  0.022  0.198  0.160   0.222  0.120  0.157 
YD Included  Included Included   Included  Included  Included  
Durbin-Watson  1.800  2.171   2.069   1.626  2.044  1.844 
F-value  9.463  46.453  43.095   4.419  24.260  17.619 
Adj. R²  0.726  0.934  0.929   0.350  0.786  0.724 
N  65  65  65   128  128  128 
Notation: T-statistics are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. A total of 211 annual reports are collected with 193 (65 financial and 128 non-financial) usable 
annual reports for listed and non-listed Libyan companies. Annual reports for five years (2006-2010) are 
collected from the LSM, company websites, Audit Bureau, and Tax Authority. Variables are defined as 
follows: Listed is regression model for listed companies; Non-listed is regression model for non-listed 
companies; Weighted index is instrumental variable created using an alternative weighted index; 2SLS is 
two-stage least squares; NLM is non-linear model re-estimated by including the squared values of BoardS, 
ForOwn, GovOwn, InstOwn and DirOwn; MD is the mandatory disclosure; VD is the voluntary disclosure; 
ODL is the overall disclosure level; β0 is the constant term; Boards is the board size; DualP is the role 
duality; BoCo is the board composition; FreMee is the frequency of meetings; AuCo is the auditor committee; 
ForOwn is foreign ownership; InstOwn is institutional ownership; GovOwn is government ownership; 
DirOwn is director ownership; FS is firm size; FA is firm age; Prof is profitability; Liq is liquidity; Lis is 
listing status; IndTyp is industry type and AudTyp is auditor type. 
 
 
